I cryptanalyze the pairing-free digital signature scheme of Islam et al. which is proven secure against "adaptive chosen message attacks". I introduce this type of forgery to analyze their scheme. Furthermore, I comment on general security issues that should be considered when making improvements on their scheme. My security analysis is also applicable to other digital signatures designed in a similar manner.
Introduction
Certificateless public-key cryptography solves the certificate management problem in traditional public-key cryptography, and solves the key-escrow problem in identity-based publickey cryptography. There are numerous certificateless signature schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . designed for different applications. To avoid bilinear pairing operations, Islam and Biswas [9] recently proposed a pairing-free certificateless digital signature scheme using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). They also proved that their scheme was secure "against adaptive chosen-message and identity attacks" in the random oracle model. In this paper, I analyze the security of Islam et al.'s scheme and demonstrate that it is not secure even though it is proven secure against "adaptive chosen-message and identity attacks". Furthermore, I comment on general security issues that should be considered when making improvements on their scheme. The security of other similar schemes can be checked using the same techniques, I employed in our study.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the security problem in Islam et al.'s [9] scheme. Section 3 presents the security heal. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
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Security analysis of Islam et al.'s scheme [9]
Adversary A can forge a valid signature on m by replacing the public key.
• After obtaining (ID S , R S ), A randomly selects d A , x A ∈ Z * q , computes P A = x A P, H 0 (ID S , R S , P A ), P ′ pub = (d A P − R S )H 0 −1 and replaces master public key P pub with P ′ pub and ID S 's P S with P A so that
as full private key of the signer where
, and sets (P A , R S ) as the full public key. Thus, σ A P = Y A −t A P A −h A (R S +H 0 (ID S , P A , R S )P pub ′ ). Therefore, the generated signature can pass the verification, and A generates a signature successfully.
Formal proof to heal the security
When designing a signature protocol such as the one described above, the system public key P pub should be hashed to eliminate the possibility of this type of forgery. A proposal to heal the security in [9] is given as follows.
• When executing Partial-Private-Key-Extract in [9] , if P pub is hashed in H 0 , private key part d i is computed as d i = (r i + x H 0 (ID i , R i , P i , P pub )) mod q so that the user can validate their partial private key tuple
• Now, after obtaining (ID S , R S ), if A attempts to forge the signature in the same manner described in the previous section, it then randomly selects d A , x A ∈ Z * q , computes P A = x A P, H 0 (ID S , R S , P A , P pub ), P ′ pub = (d A P − R S ) H 0 −1 , and replaces master public key P pub with P ′ pub and ID S 's P S with P A .
• For the verification, one checks the equation d A P = R S + H 0 (ID S , R S , P A , P ′ pub )P ′ pub , which will not hold. Therefore, forgery is not possible.
One can check the security of other proposed schemes that employ designs similar to the one described above.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that Islam et al.'s pairing-free certificate-less digital signature scheme is not secure against some forgery types even though it is proven secure against "adaptive chosen-message attacks". Furthermore, we commented on security issues to present a countermeasure.
